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Cameco has become the go‑to equity for investors who want exposure to the “nuclear renaissance” and the uranium bull market. At roughly $116.50 per share, the stock now sits at the intersection of powerful structural tailwinds and a very demanding valuation that assumes a lot has to keep going right.

In our latest deep dive, we looked at Cameco’s filings, uranium market data, and the evolving story around its Westinghouse stake. According to the 6-K (2026), pp. 1, 3–4, Cameco is no longer just a uranium miner; it’s an integrated fuel‑cycle player that delivers uranium, conversion, and fuel services, plus an ownership interest in Westinghouse Electric Company and Global Laser Enrichment. That multi‑leg model is exactly what draws in institutions looking for a one‑stop nuclear exposure.

But a compelling strategic story doesn’t automatically make for a good entry point.

At today’s price, CCJ trades around 118x earnings and roughly 78x EV/EBITDA based on FMP financials, a level that essentially assumes sustained premium uranium prices, intact contracting momentum, and a relatively smooth conversion of Westinghouse optionality into cash earnings. The market narrative is crowded and upbeat; our job is to disentangle narrative from numbers and decide whether the risk‑reward still makes sense.

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In this article, we’ll walk through how we’re framing Cameco today: why our rating is “WAIT,” what has to happen in the next 6–18 months, and what would make us change our mind.

Cameco’s integrated nuclear-fuel model: more than just a uranium bet

Cameco reports across three main segments: uranium, fuel services, and its equity share of Westinghouse. Together they form an “integrated” model designed to link mine supply, conversion, fuel services, and reactor services/new builds into one interconnected cash‑flow stack.

According to the 6-K (2026), pp. 1, 4, 12, Cameco:

Delivered 33.0 million pounds of uranium under contract in 2025
Delivered 13.1 million kgU of fuel services product
Produced 21.0 million pounds (equity share) of uranium, above revised guidance
Held significant ownership interests in Westinghouse Electric Company and Global Laser Enrichment

Management repeatedly emphasizes that it aligns production to the contract portfolio and will not bring forward uncommitted volumes just to chase spot price spikes. As laid out in the 6-K (2026), p. 1, this is a deliberate strategic choice: Cameco wants to be the reliable counterparty for utilities over the long term, not a pure commodity swing trader.

That posture shows up clearly in 2025 operational execution. Cameco:

Produced 21.0M lbs (equity share)
Delivered 33.0M lbs, supported by 9.6M lbs of purchases
Ended the year with 9.7M lbs in inventory at an average cost of $61.85/lb

The gap between production and deliveries, bridged by purchases and inventory, is exactly how the company manages delivery risk and smooths operations through the cycle 6-K (2026), p. 4.

Financially, all three legs contributed meaningfully in 2025:

Uranium segment: $2,874M revenue, $803M gross profit
Fuel services: $562M revenue, $179M earnings before income taxes
Westinghouse (Cameco share): $3,458M revenue, $780M adjusted EBITDA

These figures from the 6-K (2026), p. 3 are a big part of why the market now views Cameco as a diversified nuclear platform rather than “just another miner.”

For us, that integrated structure is a real moat — but it’s still a cyclical moat, not a bond‑like cash machine. Contracting volumes, uranium prices, FX, and the lumpiness of Westinghouse distributions all feed directly into earnings quality.

Why we rate CCJ a “WAIT” at $116.50

Our house view: CCJ is a high‑quality franchise, but no margin of safety exists at the current valuation.

Based on FMP data embedded in our research:

P/E: ~117.8x
EV/EBITDA: ~78.4x
Net debt to EBITDA: roughly -0.1 (net cash)
Interest coverage: ~9.7x

So Cameco has a very healthy balance sheet — $1.2B of cash and short‑term investments versus $1.0B total debt, with a $200M U.S. term loan repaid during 2025, per the 6-K (2026), p. 2. It also raised its annual dividend to $0.24 per share.

The problem isn’t solvency or operational competence. The problem is expectations.

At today’s multiples, the market is already pricing in:

Sustained high realized uranium prices
Ongoing strength in long‑term contracting
A clean, compounding contribution from Westinghouse

Yet Cameco’s own disclosures flag variability and noise. The company:

Doesn’t use hedge accounting under IFRS, so derivatives are marked to market and then adjusted out of “adjusted net earnings,” creating a $278M swing in 2025 alone 6-K (2026), pp. 5–6
Recorded a one‑time‑like US$350M Westinghouse distribution (US$171.5M CCJ share) linked to Dukovany participation, and explicitly said it does not expect a comparable payment this year 6-K (2026), p. 2
Removed its five‑year outlook for Westinghouse due to variability in the timing and magnitude of projects, guiding only for the current year 6-K (2026), p. 10

That is not the profile of a stable, linear grower that warrants 70–80x EBITDA on our numbers.

Our base case, as summarized in the one‑pager, assigns a 50% probability to an implied value around $115. That base case assumes:

Uranium contracting remains active enough to keep long‑term commitments near ~230M lbs
Cameco continues delivering around ~28M lbs/year on average over five years
Segment profits track roughly 2025 levels

We view current pricing as essentially fair value under optimistic but not heroic assumptions — which is why we recommend waiting for either:

A more attractive entry (below ~$95) while uranium and contracting remain firm, or
Clearer evidence that Westinghouse can move new‑build optionality into actual cash earnings.

Is CCJ stock a buy in 2026?

We think this is the question most investors are really asking. And our honest answer is: it depends on your timeframe and your tolerance for multiple compression risk.

From a 12–24 month perspective, the equity story rests on two observable scorecards:

1. Uranium price support

2. Long-term contracting visibility

1. Uranium price support

Spot uranium has been strong. The American Nuclear Society notes that spot reached $94.28/lb U3O8 at the end of January 2026, the highest since February 2024, as cited in ANS, Feb 3 2026. TradingEconomics showed prices around $85.25/lb in early February 2026, with a modeled 12‑month forward level of roughly $90.8/lb, per TradingEconomics, Feb 8 2026.

On the supply side, discipline is still intact. Kazatomprom, the world’s biggest producer, has signaled plans to lower 2026 production, a supportive backdrop for term pricing according to World Nuclear News, Aug 2025.

Cameco’s uranium segment economics are heavily influenced by realized prices, FX, and timing, not a direct 1:1 passthrough of spot. As the 6-K (2026), pp. 3, 5 explains, the company sells primarily under long‑term contracts, so price uplift flows through as contracts reset and new agreements are signed.

Our near‑term checkpoint is simple: if uranium spot and the forward proxy break down materially from the high‑80s/low‑90s by May 2026, we’d view that as a sign the equity multiple may compress faster than earnings can grow. That’s one of our explicit 90‑day risk triggers in the research.

2. Long-term contracting visibility

The second core pillar is Cameco’s contract book.

After meeting its 2025 commitments, Cameco still had about 230M lbs of long‑term uranium commitments, averaging roughly 28M lbs per year over the next five years, as disclosed in the 6-K (2026), p. 4. On the fuel services side, around 83M kgU UF6 of contracted conversion volumes underpin operations 6-K (2026), pp. 3–4.

This is the “visibility” that bulls highlight: a multi‑year runway of deliveries at improving price levels.

We agree that this contract base is valuable, but it is not static. Our thesis explicitly calls out:

If the 230M lbs total declines meaningfully over the next two quarters without offsetting new contracts, the visibility leg fails.
If contracted uranium volumes are disclosed as insufficient to underpin fuel services operations as expected, the integrated model loses its utilization engine 6-K (2026), pp. 4, 11.

Our 180‑day checkpoint (around August 2026) is anchored exactly on whether that 230M lbs / 28M lbs‑per‑year profile is sustained or improved. No improvement — or worse, a decline — would push us toward resizing or exiting.

In other words: CCJ can be a buy in 2026, but only if you believe both high uranium prices and robust contracting remain in place long enough for earnings to grow into the multiple. We’re not opposed to owning it, but at $116.50, we prefer to hold or wait rather than add aggressively.

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Will Cameco deliver long-term growth through Westinghouse?

The wild card in the CCJ story is Westinghouse. It’s a key reason many investors frame Cameco as “nuclear infrastructure plus uranium,” not just a commodity play.

What Westinghouse contributes today

In 2025, Cameco’s share of Westinghouse generated:

$3,458M in revenue
$780M in adjusted EBITDA

Those numbers, from the 6-K (2026), p. 3, are substantial. They validate the idea that Cameco has a real services/technology asset attached to its mining and fuel operations.

Cash, however, has been lumpy. The standout event was the US$350M distribution tied to Westinghouse’s participation in the Dukovany project, of which Cameco’s share was US$171.5M 6-K (2026), p. 2. Management explicitly stated they don’t expect a comparable distribution this year, which means investors should treat this as a one‑off boost, not a recurring dividend stream.

The path from narrative to cash

The bigger question is whether Westinghouse can turn its pipeline of global reactor projects into a steady flow of funded, profitable work.

Cameco’s filings are clear: the assumptions behind Westinghouse’s adjusted EBITDA outlook depend on:

Definitive agreements with the U.S. Government
The executive branch’s ability to obtain funding/support
At least one project commencing during the year

This is all spelled out in the 6-K (2026), p. 10. In fact, management went so far as to remove its five‑year Westinghouse outlook due to variability in the timing and magnitude of new‑build projects.

On the positive side, we are seeing real financing milestones. A notable example: Westinghouse welcomed a U.S. financing package to support Poland’s first nuclear power plant using AP1000 technology, described as an important first milestone toward full project financing in Westinghouse, Feb 17 2026. That kind of development increases the probability that AP1000 and other Westinghouse designs become bankable on a global scale.

Our base case assigns a 25% probability to a bull scenario with an implied value around $150, where:

Project finance converts into firm FID/EPC awards
New‑build optionality turns into visible cash earnings
Westinghouse EBITDA and distributions ramp into 2026

But we also have a 25% bear scenario (implied value ~$80). In that world, Westinghouse’s new‑build monetization remains stuck in “announcement mode,” while uranium prices reprice below $80/lb as supply discipline falters, compressing cash generation through 2026.

For us, Westinghouse is not yet a reason to pay any price for CCJ. It’s a reason to stay engaged and watch for concrete FID/EPC awards and funding‑backed project starts over the next 6–18 months.

Market sentiment: CCJ as the crowded nuclear trade

One of the more important pieces of our work on CCJ is recognizing how crowded the narrative has become.

Recent media coverage routinely positions Cameco as:

A primary beneficiary of AI‑driven power demand and energy security policy
A core play on Western reactor deployment and the $80B U.S. nuclear partnership
The go‑to “integrated” nuclear equity play (uranium + fuel services + Westinghouse)

Examples include coverage in Barron’s, Oct 2025, Business Insider, Jan 2026, and MarketWatch, Oct 2025. Price‑action driven headlines, such as those from Trefis in January 2026 and Trefis again, further reinforce the momentum framing.

We see three key sentiment dynamics:

1. From policy to price momentum

Earlier, the story centered on “nuclear renaissance” policies and Westinghouse’s U.S. government partnerships. Recently, coverage has shifted toward uranium price strength and sector‑wide rallies, as documented by Trefis, Jan 2026.

2. Good news vs. stock reaction tension

Articles from Investing.com, Feb 2026 and Zacks, Feb 2026 note that even positive results and guidance can coincide with short‑term stock pullbacks. That’s often a sign expectations are elevated.

3. Consensus “one-stop” uranium/nuclear equity

Across multiple outlets, CCJ is framed as the preferred equity expression of the nuclear cycle, with its integrated model repeatedly highlighted as a differentiator Business Insider, Jan 2026.

For us as fundamental investors, crowdedness doesn’t automatically mean “sell,” but it does lower our willingness to stretch on valuation. When sentiment is universally bullish, any deviation in uranium prices, contracting, or Westinghouse progress can trigger outsized downside.

Risk framework: what breaks the CCJ thesis?

A disciplined thesis isn’t just about what could go right; it’s about specifying what would make us change our mind.

From our report, the main “thesis breakers” are:

Westinghouse stagnation by FY2026 reporting

If Westinghouse still lacks definitive U.S. Government agreements and at least one project commencement in‑year — conditions explicitly baked into the adjusted EBITDA assumptions in the 6-K (2026), p. 10 — we’d view the buildout monetization as delayed and likely resize or exit.

Deterioration in long-term uranium commitments

If subsequent disclosures show the ~230M lbs long‑term commitment total declining without offsetting new contracts, the visibility thesis erodes. This is a core risk flagged in the 6-K (2026), p. 4.

Contract volumes insufficient to underpin fuel services

Cameco itself notes risk that contracted uranium volumes may not be sufficient to underpin fuel services operations as expected 6-K (2026), p. 11. If that risk is realized, the integrated model’s utilization advantage disappears.

Alongside those binary triggers, we monitor early warning indicators:

Uranium spot falling back sharply from ~$94/lb and forward curves repricing below ~$80/lb, per ANS, Feb 2026 and TradingEconomics, Feb 2026
Westinghouse distributions normalizing lower, reinforcing that Dukovany was a non‑recurring event 6-K (2026), p. 2
Growing derivative mark‑to‑market noise, widening the gap between reported and adjusted earnings 6-K (2026), p. 5

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How we’d trade around Cameco from here

Putting all this together, our trading stance is straightforward:

Rating: WAIT
Conviction: 3.0/5
Trim Above: $140
Attractive Entry: ~$95
Re‑Assessment Window: 3–6 months

We see current pricing as a fair reflection of a strong uranium tape plus a widely shared belief in a multi‑year nuclear buildout. But we also think the equity is fragile to any sign that either uranium prices roll over or contracting momentum stalls.

Our downside boundaries are explicitly coupled:

1. If uranium spot drops below $80/lb within two quarters and

2. Long‑term commitments fall below ~210M lbs

…then we see capital impairment risk rising sharply. In that environment, we’d expect both earnings expectations and the multiple to compress.

On the flip side, we’d become more constructive if:

Shares fall below ~$95 while uranium spot stays above ~$85/lb
Long‑term commitments remain near ~230M lbs (or improve)
We see concrete Westinghouse FID/EPC announcements adding to visible cash earnings

In that setup, you’d be getting the same structural story at a much better price, with less reliance on speculative Westinghouse torque to justify the valuation.

Final thoughts: a great business at a demanding price

Our work on Cameco leaves us with two simultaneous truths:

1. It is one of the highest‑quality, best‑positioned assets in the uranium and nuclear fuel ecosystem.

2. The stock price already reflects that reality — and then some.

The integrated business model (mining, fuel services, Westinghouse) is a genuine competitive advantage, especially when paired with disciplined contract‑aligned production. The balance sheet is strong, 2025 execution was solid, and the contract book offers multi‑year visibility that many commodity producers would envy.

But with P/E north of 100x and EV/EBITDA in the high 70s on our inputs, CCJ has very little room for disappointment. Any sign of weakening uranium prices, slower contracting, or delayed Westinghouse monetization could drive painful multiple compression, even if the long‑term nuclear thesis remains intact.

For now, we’re content to:

Hold or wait, not chase
Watch uranium prices and the 230M‑lbs contract book closely
Track Westinghouse for real, funded project starts rather than high‑level announcements

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Cameco (CCJ) Deep Research Report: Overvalued vs. Opportunity in the Uranium Super-Cycle